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REGULATING SEARCH WARRANT EXECUTION 
PROCEDURE FOR STORED ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS 
Sara J. Dennis* 
 
Electronic communication services, from email, to social media, to 
messaging applications, have not only dramatically changed daily life but 
have also had a profound impact on criminal investigations and procedure.  
The often large volume of electronically stored information has led to a two-
step process for search warrant execution, codified in Federal Criminal 
Procedure Rule 41.  When conducting a search pursuant to Rule 41, law 
enforcement often retains both responsive items—materials that fall within 
the scope of the warrant—and nonresponsive materials—intermingled items 
that can be searched, but ultimately exceed the scope of the warrant.  This 
possession of nonresponsive material creates a tension between the account 
holder’s privacy interests and the government’s ability to conduct an 
effective search. 
Courts and scholars have implemented and proposed a range of 
approaches for search warrant execution in light of concerns about sweeping 
general searches and the practicalities of searching electronically stored 
information.  This Note examines these approaches to regulate search 
warrant execution procedure in the context of stored electronic 
communications.  This Note also discusses the strengths and shortcomings of 
these various mechanisms and concludes that Rule 41 should be amended to 
provide standards for the retention and use of nonresponsive material. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With the widespread use of electronic communication in personal and 
professional life, records maintained by electronic service providers have 
become a valuable source of evidence in criminal investigations and are 
requested in high volumes.1  Whether in the form of email, social media, or 
 
 1. Google and Microsoft alone have produced data in response to tens of thousands of 
law enforcement requests from January 2014 through June 2017. Law Enforcement Requests 
Report, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/about/corporate-responsibility/lerr 
[https://perma.cc/A23V-RNWE] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018); Transparency Report, GOOGLE, 
https://transparencyreport.google.com/user-data/overview?user_requests_report_period= 
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mobile messages sent through downloadable applications, electronic 
communications can possess highly relevant evidence of criminal acts, from 
shedding light on a person’s mens rea2 to detailing the scope and manner of 
criminal conduct.3  While electronic communications4 are valuable sources 
of information, some courts and scholars have expressed concern that the 
procedure for searching electronic materials can turn search warrants for such 
information into de facto general warrants,5 which undermines the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment.6 
Compared to searches of physical locations, search warrants for electronic 
communications can, and frequently do, yield higher volumes of records, 
which then require a lengthier review process.7  As a result, the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure were amended to allow law enforcement to obtain a 
larger set of intermingled, potentially pertinent electronic materials, and 
subsequently search those records for items that actually fall within the scope 
of the warrant.8  But this process creates a situation where the government 
possesses innocuous items in addition to evidence of a crime.9  The product 
of Rule 41—law enforcement’s ability to retain materials that are beyond the 
scope of a warrant—creates a conflict between practical necessities and 
privacy interests. 
This tension is highlighted in one case where a magistrate judge considered 
the government’s application to search a Facebook account that belonged to 
an individual who perpetrated a mass shooting at a military facility.10  During 
 
series:requests,accounts;authority:US&lu=user_requests_report_period [https://perma.cc/ 
Q2PS-6SGV] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 2. See, e.g., In re Search of Info. Associated with the Facebook Account Identified by 
the Username Aaron.Alexis That Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Facebook, Inc., 21 F. 
Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2013) (explaining the government’s belief that Facebook posts would 
reveal information about the shooter’s motivations). 
 3. See, e.g., United States v. Kanodia, No. 15-10131-NMG, 2016 WL 3166370, at *1 (D. 
Mass. June 6, 2016) (involving email communications that contained wire instructions for 
proceeds connected to a securities fraud conspiracy). 
 4. This Note focuses on internet-based communication services, such as email, social 
media, and messaging applications, where the provider stores its customers’ records. See infra 
notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
 5. See, e.g., In re Facebook Account Identified by the Username Aaron.Alexis, 21 F. 
Supp. 3d at 8 (stating that electronic searches require the creation of minimization procedures 
in order to prevent them from functioning as general warrants). 
 6. See United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 445 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The chief evil that 
prompted the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment was the ‘indiscriminate searches 
and seizures’ conducted by the British ‘under the authority of general warrants.’” (quoting 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980))).  The general warrants involved 
unconstrained searches amounting to “rummag[ing] at will.” Id. (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 
U.S. 332, 345 (2009)). 
 7. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee’s notes to 2009 amendment (stating that 
allowing subsequent off-site review of electronically stored information is a practical necessity 
given the frequently large volume of stored materials). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. (acknowledging that the government could possess nonresponsive materials by 
stating that the determination of which documents fall within the scope of a warrant can be 
made later). 
 10. See In re Facebook Account Identified by the Username Aaron.Alexis, 21 F. Supp. 3d 
at 1; see also Michael D. Shear & Michael S. Schmidt, Gunman and 12 Victims Killed in 
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the investigation, the government learned that the shooter had posted “mini-
rants” on his Facebook page.11  The government believed that access to the 
shooter’s account would yield information indicating his motive for 
committing the crime and whether any coconspirators were involved in the 
plan.12  While Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola recognized the importance 
for law enforcement to search these records accurately and effectively, he 
was also concerned with the privacy interests of anyone who might have 
communicated with the shooter during the specified date range.13 
Search and seizure law has always sought to square these interests in a just 
manner.  Yet courts still struggle to find the appropriate balance and 
procedural consistency in the context of electronically stored information 
(ESI).14  The current ambiguity, paradoxically, can undermine both 
procedural and privacy interests by complicating reliance on ESI evidence in 
criminal prosecutions and threatening the privacy of account holders (and 
those with whom they communicate).15  These balancing questions affect a 
wide array of cases as electronic communications evidence has been used to 
investigate occurrences of securities fraud,16 child sex trafficking,17 identity 
theft,18 drug trafficking,19 wire fraud,20 and intentional damage to a protected 
computer,21 among various other crimes. 
This Note explores the gaps in the law governing reasonable search and 
seizure of stored electronic communications.22  Part I provides background 
on search warrant procedure pertaining to ESI and the adaptations in criminal 
procedure in the digital age.  Part II details the ex ante and ex post measures 
 
Shooting at D.C. Navy Yard, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
09/17/us/shooting-reported-at-washington-navy-yard.html [https://perma.cc/2J2R-EUJY].  
For the government’s proposed search warrant for Aaron Alexis’s Facebook account, see infra 
Appendix A. 
 11. In re Facebook Account Identified by the Username Aaron.Alexis, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 
3. 
 12. Id. at 7. 
 13. Id. at 6.  In light of these concerns, Judge Facciola issued an order limiting the 
information Facebook could provide to the government. See infra Appendix B. 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See infra Part II (outlining the various mechanisms of regulation and review imposed 
by judges).  Such range in approach hinders the ability to anticipate how the execution of a 
warrant will be analyzed. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.  
 16. See, e.g., United States v. Kanodia, No. 15-10131-NMG, 2016 WL 3166370, at *1 (D. 
Mass. June 6, 2016). 
 17. See, e.g., United States v. Blake, 868 F.3d 960, 966 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 18. See, e.g., In re Search of Info. Associated with Fifteen Email Addresses Stored at 
Premises Owned, Maintained, Controlled or Operated by 1&1 Media, Inc., Google, Inc., 
Microsoft Corp. & Yahoo! Inc., No. 2:17-CM-3152-WC, 2017 WL 4322826, at *1 (M.D. Ala. 
Sept. 28, 2017). 
 19. See, e.g., United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 82 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 20. See, e.g., United States v. Patel, No. 16-cr-798 (KBF), 2017 WL 3394607, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2017). 
 21. See, e.g., United States v. Shah, No. 5:13-CR-328-FL, 2015 WL 72118, at *1 
(E.D.N.C. Jan. 6, 2015). 
 22. Specifically, this Note addresses the execution of search warrants obtained with 
respect to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)–(b).  It will not analyze procedures where records are obtained 
without a search warrant, as permitted under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
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that courts have implemented in the absence of clear regulations or precedent 
on searches in this context.  Part II also describes additional procedures 
scholars have proposed.  Finally, Part III recommends amending Federal 
Criminal Procedure Rule 41 to guide the proper handling of nonresponsive 
material.23 
I.  OBTAINING AND EXECUTING SEARCH WARRANTS FOR STORED 
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 
With the rise of internet-based services that maintain and store user content 
on their own servers, law enforcement agencies frequently obtain records 
directly from electronic communications service providers rather than from 
the users themselves.24  This Part describes the authorization and procedure 
to obtain a search warrant for ESI.  Part I.A discusses how the government 
obtains information from an electronic communications service provider 
under the Stored Communications Act and the “two-step” process for seizing 
and searching ESI under Federal Criminal Procedure Rule 41.  Part I.B then 
describes the constitutional baseline for the “second-step” ESI search and 
overarching reasonableness requirement in search warrant execution. 
A.  The Stored Communications Act and 
Federal Criminal Procedure Rule 41 
Since the 1980s, Congress has attempted to adapt to the proliferation of 
digital communication and law enforcement’s use of related records in 
criminal investigations.  The Stored Communications Act (SCA),25 enacted 
in 1986, sought to both protect the privacy of electronic communications and 
recognize a mechanism for law enforcement to obtain such content 
lawfully.26  The SCA specifically empowers a governmental entity to 
“require a provider of remote computing service to disclose the contents of 
any wire or electronic communication . . . held or maintained on that service” 
by obtaining a warrant conforming to the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure or applicable state law.27  Unlike a traditional premises search 
warrant, executing an SCA warrant does not require law enforcement 
personnel to be present for the initial gathering of communications—instead, 
 
 23. The term “nonresponsive” is used throughout this Note to refer to materials that fall 
beyond a search warrant’s specified scope of items that may be seized. 
 24. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).   
 25. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1861 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012)). 
 26. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557 
(commenting that a person’s privacy interest should not change when information is copied, 
maintained, and stored electronically and reiterating the need to balance privacy interests with 
law enforcement needs).  
 27. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b).  While the SCA also permits seizure of certain evidence without 
a warrant through a court order under subsection (d) of this Section, this Note only addresses 
electronic communications obtained pursuant to search warrants. 
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the service provider may turn over copies of the described items from its 
servers.28 
This provision covers a range of electronic service providers, including 
email providers,29 social media companies,30 and messaging application 
services.31  While the availability of specific content depends on the provider 
and the type of electronic account,32 a warrant generally specifies the account 
from which communications are sought and may also include a pertinent date 
range or specific types of data.33  For example, in the case of a Facebook 
account, a warrant description may include any public posts made to a page 
and any private messages, and it may exclude photos of the subject posted by 
another user.34 
 
 28. See, e.g., United States v. Patel, No. 16-cr-798 (KBF), 2017 WL 3394607, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2017); In re Warrant for All Content & Other Info. Associated with the 
Email Account xxxxxxx@gmail.com Maintained at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., 33 
F. Supp. 3d 386, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 29. See, e.g., Legal Process for User Data Requests FAQ, GOOGLE, https://support. 
google.com/transparencyreport/answer/7381738?hl=en [https://perma.cc/8RKG-DGEU] (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 30. See, e.g., Information for Law Enforcement Authorities, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/safety/groups/law/guidelines [https://perma.cc/NTM4-3F9P] (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2018) (“A search warrant issued under the procedures described in the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure or equivalent state warrant procedures upon a showing of 
probable cause is required to compel the disclosure of the stored contents of any account, 
which may include messages, photos, videos, timeline posts, and location information.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Snapchat Law Enforcement Guide, SNAPCHAT 3 (Oct. 11, 2016), 
https://storage.googleapis.com/snap-inc/privacy/lawenforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/E75B-
3KTR] (acknowledging that Snapchat’s ability to provide user information is dictated by 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712); see also United States v. Price, No. 17-CR-301 (NGG), 2017 WL 
4838307, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2017) (rejecting the defendant’s motion to suppress a search 
warrant for the defendant’s Snapchat account). 
 32. See, e.g., Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/policy.php 
[https://perma.cc/4B8W-G4DG] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (listing the types of information 
Facebook collects on account holders, including the account holder’s communications, content 
others provide to or about the account holder, financial transactions, and device information); 
Guidelines for Law Enforcement, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-
policies/twitter-law-enforcement-support#3 [https://perma.cc/XM2M-A4LD] (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2018) (describing the account content available pursuant to an SCA warrant and data 
retention limitations); Legal Process for User Data Requests FAQs, supra note 29 (listing the 
content available in response to search warrants for Gmail, YouTube, Google Voice, and 
Blogger products); Legal Process Guidelines, APPLE 7–12 (Mar. 23, 2018), 
https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelines-us.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JQQ6-B9ST] (delineating the customer and account information Apple 
maintains, including content that may be available in an iCloud account). 
 33. See, e.g., In re Search of Info. Associated with Fifteen Email Addresses Stored at 
Premises Owned, Maintained, Controlled or Operated by 1&1 Media, Inc., Google, Inc., 
Microsoft Corp. & Yahoo! Inc., No. 2:17-CM-3152-WC, 2017 WL 4322826, at *1–2 (M.D. 
Ala. Sept. 28, 2017) (describing the warrant applications at issue which detailed specific types 
of content, pertinent record date ranges, and “fruits, evidence, and instrumentalities of 
violations of” specified criminal statutes). 
 34. See, e.g., infra Appendices A–B (exhibiting proposed warrants to Facebook, Inc. that 
parse account content to the specific types of user activity that are stored by the service 
provider); see also Brief of Appellant at 42–43, In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to 
Facebook, Inc. & Dated July 23, 2013, 78 N.E.3d 141 (N.Y. 2017) (APL-2015-00318) 
(indicating that Facebook could withhold certain categories of content associated with an 
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To better accommodate the practical necessities that arise from reviewing 
voluminous data sets, the 2009 amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure allow for a different process to obtain and search ESI.35  This 
procedure authorizes “a later review of the media or information” pursuant 
to the warrant, essentially creating a two-step process36 where law 
enforcement first obtains a broad set of ESI from the location where it is 
stored37 and then conducts a review of the ESI for material “consistent with 
the warrant.”38  As the Advisory Committee stated, the impracticality of 
reviewing a large volume of ESI on site motivated this two-step process.39  
While Rule 41 states that the ESI warrant execution deadline specifically 
pertains to the “seizure or on-site copying of the media or information, and 
not to any later off-site copying or review,” it does not mandate or suggest a 
time frame or methodology to conduct the second step of the search.40  The 
Advisory Committee explains this intentional omission by noting that “the 
practical reality is that there is no basis for a ‘one size fits all’ presumptive 
period.”41  Although the hesitation to codify universal standards is consistent 
 
account such as “Friends, Likes, [and] Groups” and asserting that warrants should omit data 
types that are not relevant). 
 35. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, ESI includes “writings, drawings, 
graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data or data compilations 
stored in any medium from which information can be obtained.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory 
committee’s notes to 2009 amendment (adopting the definition stated in Rule 34(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).  The Advisory Committee noted that Rule 34’s broad 
description, “intend[ing] to cover all current types of computer-based information and to 
encompass future changes and developments,” applies to Rule 41 as well. Id.  While case law 
pertaining to the execution of this Rule also addresses the context of computers or digital 
storage devices seized during warrant execution at a physical location, this Rule applies to 
seizures pursuant to the Stored Communications Act. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A) (2012) 
(requiring a provider to disclose the contents of electronic communication “if the 
governmental entity obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued using State warrant 
procedures) by a court of competent jurisdiction”); see, e.g., In re Warrant for All Content & 
Other Info. Associated with the Email Account xxxxxxx@gmail.com Maintained at Premises 
Controlled by Google, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 36. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(B). 
 37. This consists of obtaining records from a service provider or, alternatively, the initial 
seizure of a hard drive or computer. See, e.g., In re Search of Google Email Accounts, 99 F. 
Supp. 3d 992, 994 (D. Alaska 2015) (describing the search warrant execution process, during 
which Google was directed to provide the government with email content for six accounts). 
 38. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(B).  In practice, courts recognized this practice as valid and 
necessary prior to the amendment of the Rule. See, e.g., United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 
532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999); In re Search of:  3817 W.W. End, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 958 (N.D. 
Ill. 2004); see also Orin S. Kerr, Search Warrants in an Era of Digital Evidence, 75 MISS. L.J. 
85, 87–88 (2005) (describing the need for criminal procedure to adapt to the necessity of two-
step searches); Kaitlyn R. O’Leary, Note, What the Founders Did Not See Coming:  The 
Fourth Amendment, Digital Evidence, and the Plain View Doctrine, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
211, 217 (2013). 
 39. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee’s notes to 2009 amendment. 
 40. Id. r. 41(e)(2)(B). 
 41. Id. r. 41 advisory committee’s notes to 2009 amendment.  As detailed in Part II, Rule 
41 does not preclude a judge from imposing a deadline for the return of the ESI at the time the 
warrant is issued but does not “arbitrarily set a presumptive time period for the return.” Id. 
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with the fact-specific nature of search warrant evaluation, the absence of a 
clear standard has led to a wide variety of results across cases.42 
B.  “Step Two” Execution:  The Reasonableness Touchstone for Valid 
Execution Under the Fourth Amendment 
Search warrants for ESI, like other searches subject to the Fourth 
Amendment, are governed by “the general touchstone of reasonableness.”43  
Although the mechanics of reviewing digital materials differ considerably 
from searching physical items, there is no separate procedural rule or law that 
regulates how this second step should be conducted.44  The “details of how 
best to proceed” with warrant execution have largely been left to the 
discretion of law enforcement officials.45 
For warrants authorizing searches of physical locations, developed case 
law provides benchmarks for reasonable execution.46  However, the contours 
of ESI searches are largely undeveloped and vary considerably among 
appellate courts, trial courts, and magistrate judges.47  This ambiguity is a 
natural quality in a still-developing area of law.  However, the lack of basic 
unifying standards for execution leaves law enforcement with little guidance.  
Law enforcement officers might be prohibited from executing a warrant in a 
manner that might be ultimately considered constitutionally reasonable48 or 
might be uncertain whether their execution methodology will cause the 
suppression of the evidence at trial.49  Similarly, the privacy interests of 
 
 42. See infra Parts II.A–B. 
 43. United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 136 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. 
Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998)), rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2016); see also United 
States v. Matias, 836 F.2d 744, 747 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that officers cannot seize and retain 
items outside the scope of the warrant); United States v. Scully, 108 F. Supp. 3d 59, 100 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015) (applying the touchstone of reasonableness to the context of search warrants 
for ESI); United States v. Lustyik, 57 F. Supp. 3d 213, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Like all 
activities governed by the Fourth Amendment, the execution of a search warrant must be 
reasonable.”). 
 44. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee’s notes to 2009 amendment (delegating 
search execution details to judicial regulation). 
 45. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 (1979); see also Ganias, 755 F.3d at 136; In 
re Warrant for All Content & Other Info. Associated with the Email Account 
xxxxxxx@gmail.com Maintained at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 
396 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 46. See United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95–97 (2006) (discussing anticipatory 
warrant validity); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997) (addressing knock-and-
announce requirements and exceptions); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822–24 (1982) 
(discussing limitations on searching closed containers).  
 47. See infra Part II; see also Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and 
Seizure, 96 VA. L. REV. 1241, 1244 (2010).  
 48. Kerr, supra note 47, at 1246 (arguing that “[p]redictions of reasonableness are highly 
error-prone” in the absence of sufficient facts to make the determination in each respective 
case).  
 49. See id. at 1280 (stating that repeated ex post judicial review of search reasonableness 
leads to the development of general standards that law enforcement can follow).  It follows 
that in the absence of such standards, there is greater uncertainty about future judicial 
evaluations.  The variation in judicial response, detailed in Part II, heightens this uncertainty. 
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individual account holders also suffer as the government might retain 
personal data unrelated to the case.50 
Even with the 2009 amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, questions debated over ten years ago about the process of 
searching digital materials remain unanswered today.  Does reasonableness 
govern the timing of the subsequent search, and, if so, what length of time is 
reasonable?51  What procedures and protocols, if any, are necessary to ensure 
warrant particularity or reasonable search execution?52  And finally, is ESI 
so different that it requires distinct modifications to established search and 
seizure doctrine?53 
II.  APPROACHES TO EXECUTING THE REVIEW 
OF ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION 
In response to the lack of procedural guidelines, courts have responded at 
the magistrate level when the warrant is granted or denied and subsequently 
in trial courts during the consideration of suppression motions.  Part II.A 
details the ex ante requirements some magistrate judges have implemented 
to regulate the scope, duration, and method of search execution.  Part II.B 
examines ex post rulings on reasonability of the search and discusses the 
extent to which these rulings provide adequate guidance for subsequent 
cases.  Next, Part II.C discusses the divergent approaches to the plain view 
doctrine in the context of ESI and Part II.D analyzes suggested policy 
responses. 
A.  Ex Ante Orders Regulating Search Methodology and Execution 
Magistrate judges have issued ex ante orders with the objective of 
curtailing the breadth of the warrant.  Though far from universally applied by 
magistrates who review warrant applications, those who have required 
secondary orders or specific provisions to be written into the warrant itself 
express concern about granting warrants for ESI that might effectively 
 
 50. See In re Search of Premises Known As:  Three Hotmail Email Accounts:  
[redacted]@hotmail.com, [redacted]@hotmail.com, [redacted]@hotmail.com Belonging to & 
Seized from [redacted], No. 16-MJ-8036-DJW, 2016 WL 1239916, at *13 (D. Kan. Mar. 28, 
2016) (“The search of an email account ‘would typically expose to the government far more 
than the most exhaustive search of a house:  [an email account] not only contains in digital 
form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad array of 
private information never found in a home in any form.’” (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. 
Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014))), aff’d in part sub nom. In re Search of Info. Associated with Email 
Addresses Stored at Premises Controlled by the Microsoft Corp., 212 F. Supp. 3d 1023 (D. 
Kan. 2016); Paul Ohm, Massive Hard Drives, General Warrants, and the Power of Magistrate 
Judges, 97 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 1, 6–7 (2011) (noting that widespread use of email services and 
social media has led to unprecedented large-scale storage of communications and highlighting 
that “[e]ven when we aren’t hoarding, our computers are”). 
 51. See Kerr, supra note 38, at 117–24 (discussing the divergence between courts in 
evaluating whether searches for ESI within a certain time period are constitutional). 
 52. See id. at 113–14. 
 53. See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 
554–57 (2005). 
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become unconstitutional general warrants.54  These magistrates impose such 
ex ante requirements under the belief that they enhance the particularity of 
the warrant in detailing items to be seized or, alternatively, provide 
safeguards for their reasonable execution.55 
While concerns about issuing general warrants are the basis for such ex 
ante action, magistrate-issued orders have addressed differing aspects of the 
search by (1) instituting time limits on completion, (2) mandating return or 
deletion of nonresponsive materials, or (3) enumerating specific search 
protocol to be utilized during execution. 
1.  Time Limits to Complete “Second-Step” Search of Materials 
The amendment to Rule 41, which formally authorizes the two-step 
process, clarifies that the fourteen-day execution requirement applies only to 
the initial seizure of the materials, which leaves the timing of the subsequent 
review open to judicial analysis.56  As a result, some magistrates have 
regulated the warrant process by ordering a deadline for search completion 
in the absence of a statutory requirement.57  Magistrates have imposed this 
deadline at the time the warrant is granted, with the possibility of requesting 
an extension,58 or after the initial seizure of materials.59 
 
 54. See, e.g., In re Search of Info. Associated with Fifteen Email Addresses Stored at 
Premises Owned, Maintained, Controlled or Operated by 1&1 Media, Inc., Google, Inc., 
Microsoft Corp. & Yahoo! Inc., No. 2:17-CM-3152-WC, 2017 WL 4322826, at *10 (M.D. 
Ala. Sept. 28, 2017) (ruling that the warrant should be issued with an accompanying order that 
the accounts should be searched using keywords to limit “the universe of data”); In re Three 
Hotmail Email Accounts, 2016 WL 1239916, at *23 (requiring ex ante instructions limiting 
search execution methods); see also In re Search of Info. Associated with the Facebook 
Account Identified by the Username Aaron.Alexis That Is Stored at Premises Controlled by 
Facebook, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10–11 (D.D.C. 2013) (describing the court’s use of 
secondary orders to bring search warrants under constitutional standards).  
 55. See supra note 54. 
 56. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee’s notes to 2009 amendment.  This time frame 
applies to the seizure of computers or other storage devices pursuant to a search of a physical 
location.  For warrants on an electronic communications service provider pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 2703(b), this time period best corresponds to when the warrant is served on the 
provider as it is analogous to the initial seizure of a computer or hard drive. 
 57. See United States v. Brunette, 76 F. Supp. 2d 30, 42 (D. Me. 1999) (suppressing 
material obtained as a result of a search after the magistrate-issued thirty-day deadline and 
subsequent thirty-day extension).  The magistrate judge’s decision to impose a thirty-day limit 
on the execution of the search in this case, like many other decisions on whether to grant a 
search warrant and under what limitations, is unwritten and unpublished.  Therefore, a specific 
rationale behind imposing the limitation on the search time frame is unknown. See Reid Day, 
Note, Let the Magistrates Revolt:  A Review of Search Warrant Applications for Electronic 
Information Possessed by Online Services, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 491, 520 (2015) 
(acknowledging the small number of decisions addressing the sufficiency of warrant 
applications). 
 58. See Brunette, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 42. 
 59. See, e.g., In re Search of Premises Known as 1406 N. 2nd Ave., No. 2:05-MJ-28, 2006 
WL 709036, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 17, 2006) (ordering law enforcement to submit a return 
to the court within thirty days of the warrant execution, prior to review of all computer storage 
media, along with an estimate of “the time necessary to conduct a forensics examination of 
the materials seized and the computer search protocol to be utilized”). 
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However, this practice is far from universal.  Other courts, while 
acknowledging the power of magistrate courts to impose limitations on the 
search execution, have declined to do so on the grounds that the Fourth 
Amendment does not require it and that the issue is better suited to ex post 
review for reasonableness.60  A central argument against imposing 
restrictions at the time the warrant is granted involves the government’s 
“need to retain materials as an investigation unfolds for the purpose of 
retrieving material that is authorized by the warrant.”61  This argument asserts 
that the benefit of an unrestrained review of the ESI is maintained while the 
individual’s privacy interests are protected through a “reasonableness” ex 
post inquiry of the search.62 
Even in a number of cases where a magistrate imposed a deadline for the 
review, some trial courts have not given effect to such orders and have 
refused to penalize noncompliance when the additional time taken was 
deemed to be reasonable.63  The determination of reasonability in this 
context, sufficient to abandon the magistrate’s restrictions, is in part made 
under the rationale that the government did not exhibit “reckless disregard 
for proper procedure” or that the defendant was not prejudiced.64  Beyond 
the issue of whether ex ante restrictions should be enforced, some question 
the authority of magistrate judges to issue such deadlines without explicit 
legislative or procedural mandate.65  Although ex ante orders are generally 
accepted, and not precluded by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,66 
 
 60. See, e.g., In re Warrant for All Content & Other Info. Associated with the Email 
Account xxxxxxx@gmail.com Maintained at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., 33 F. 
Supp. 3d 386, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 99 (2006)).  
 61. Id. at 398.  Magistrate Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein also noted the legitimate need to 
maintain a copy of records for the purpose of authentication at trial. Id. at 399. 
 62. Id. at 398.  The court additionally notes that Rule 41(g) offers a remedy for the return 
of property and even the destruction of copies of seized material. Id. 
 63. See United States v. Filippi, No. 5:15-CR-133 (BKS), 2015 WL 5789846, at *9 
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2015) (“[T]he Supreme Court has held that a search in violation of a 
Magistrate Judge’s directives regarding the execution of a warrant does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment, so long as the search was reasonable under the circumstances.” (citing Richards 
v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 117 (1997))); United States v. Rigmaiden, No. CR 08-814-PHX-
DGC, 2013 WL 1932800, at *29 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2013) (holding that the execution of the 
search was reasonable even though completion of the review violated the magistrate judge’s 
thirty-day deadline); United States v. Hernandez, 183 F. Supp. 2d 468, 481 (D.P.R. 2002) 
(holding that it was “perfectly reasonable for the Government to take a longer time to search 
and inspect” ESI, especially after already discovering some evidence of a crime). 
 64. United States v. Beckmann, 786 F.3d 672, 680–81 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that the 
defendant in this case was not prejudiced as “probable cause continued to exist and the 
evidence did not become stale”). 
 65. See Kerr, supra note 47, at 1260–78 (arguing that neither the rules nor case law permit 
an active role for magistrate judges and even when ex ante orders are issued, they are 
frequently unenforced).  Kerr relies, in part, on Supreme Court precedent that states that the 
Fourth Amendment only requires probable cause and particularity. Id. at 1267–68 (citing 
Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90).  But see Ohm, supra note 50, at 4 (criticizing Kerr’s presumption that 
magistrate orders that set deadlines or require certain procedures address reasonableness rather 
than particularity concerns). 
 66. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee’s notes to 2009 amendment (“The rule does 
not prevent a judge from imposing a deadline for the return of the storage media or access to 
the electronically stored information at the time the warrant is issued.  However, to arbitrarily 
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the arguments calling a magistrate’s power into question are perhaps useful 
to evaluate whether these orders are effective. 
2.  Deletion and Return of Nonresponsive Materials 
In addition to the varying time restrictions, some magistrates have required 
the government to return or destroy any material deemed nonresponsive to 
the warrant.  By imposing this requirement, courts seek to address the issue 
of overbreadth in part through limiting the possibility of any future use of 
materials that are beyond the scope of the warrant.67  Despite the authority 
given to conduct a subsequent search for responsive materials under Rule 41, 
courts have expressed discomfort in allowing these searches without 
(1) showing probable cause to seize the entire account or (2) requiring the 
government to return or destroy any materials that constitute an “over-
seizure.”68  Courts have contemplated a range of these types of restrictions; 
some have mandated assurances that “the information will be returned or, if 
copies, destroyed within a prompt period of time,”69 while others have not 
expressed any temporal indicator for when the materials must be deleted.70 
In contrast to magistrate judges who impose these restrictions ex ante (or 
make comments to this effect when rejecting an application on other 
grounds), others challenge the idea of putting a return or deletion requirement 
tied to a specific timeline up front.  While acknowledging that it was 
 
set a presumptive time period for the return could result in frequent petitions to the court for 
additional time.”). 
 67. See In re Search of Black iPhone 4, 27 F. Supp. 3d 74, 80 (D.D.C. 2014) (indicating 
that a revised warrant application must stipulate that nonresponsive seized documents will be 
returned or destroyed “within a prompt period of time” or it will be denied); In re Search of 
Info. Associated with the Facebook Account Identified by the Username Aaron.Alexis That Is 
Stored at Premises Controlled by Facebook, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9–10 (D.D.C. 2013); see 
also In re Search of Premises Known as:  Three Hotmail Email Accounts:  
[redacted]@hotmail.com, [redacted]@hotmail.com, [redacted]@hotmail.com Belonging to & 
Seized from [redacted], No. 16-MJ-8036-DJW, 2016 WL 1239916, at *23 (D. Kan. Mar. 28, 
2016) (stating generally that retention limits are an “easily enforceable tool” to protect Fourth 
Amendment rights); In re [REDACTED]@gmail.com, 62 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 
2014) (denying a warrant due to a lack of particularity and expressing concern over the absence 
of “any kind of commitment to return or destroy evidence”).  This concern precedes the digital 
context in cases involving the seizure of a large amount of documents, including those outside 
the scope of the warrant. See United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 597 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(finding that the government’s retention of master volumes of seized documents for a period 
longer than six months, absent the need for the complete copy for authentication purposes, 
was “unreasonable and therefore [an] unconstitutional manner of executing the warrant”). 
 68. In re Facebook Account Identified by the Username Aaron.Alexis, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 
9–10. 
 69. In re Search of Black iPhone, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 80.  In this case, the court stated that 
the government must include a description of “what will occur with [the nonresponsive] data,” 
and an application would likely be denied if it included any statement other than the text quoted 
above. Id.; see also United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1168–
69 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam) (requiring the government to return nonresponsive 
items “within a reasonable period of time not to exceed 60 days from the date of the seizure 
unless further authorization [was] obtained from the Court”).  
 70. See, e.g., In re Facebook Account Identified by the Username Aaron.Alexis, 21 F. 
Supp. 3d at 9–10. 
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unacceptable to retain nonresponsive material indefinitely,71 courts have 
determined that retaining materials while proceedings are ongoing, without 
intent to use them in a subsequent investigation, is reasonable.72  Similar to 
the rationale for opposing search execution deadlines,73 judges have resisted 
imposing rigid retention limits during the course of a case because they 
believe that they could hinder law enforcement’s ability to execute a 
thorough search and that better remedies exist to address impropriety.74 
3.  Mandated Protocol for How the Search Must Be Completed 
In light of privacy concerns regarding ESI searches, magistrate judges have 
also considered imposing restrictions on review procedure, with the objective 
to either narrow the particularity of items to be seized or to ensure that the 
search is conducted in a reasonable manner.  A range of options have been 
considered and implemented, including (1) requiring an independent review 
team,75 (2) utilizing targeted search terms,76 and (3) requesting an initial 
keyword screening by service providers.77  These measures all seek to 
prevent or curtail the case team from coming into contact with nonresponsive 
material. 
While approving search warrant applications, magistrates have mandated 
that an independent party or “taint team” review the electronic search warrant 
materials in order to limit law enforcement’s exposure to nonresponsive 
material.78  Although there are variations in the exact approach,79 this 
 
 71. See United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 137–38 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding that 
allowing the government to retain nonresponsive materials and subsequently search them 
pursuant to a different warrant would amount to a general search), rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d 
199 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Kelsey Joy Smith, Note, The Constitutional Right to Deletion:  
The Latest Battle in the War of Technology v. Privacy, 42 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 121, 139–42 (2016) (analyzing perceived circumvention of Rule 41(g)’s 
remedy to return seized materials and calling for Congress to issue a clear rule on government 
retention of digital property to better protect privacy rights).  
 72. See United States v. Carpenter, No. 3:13-CR-226-RNC, 2015 WL 9461496, at *6–7 
(D. Conn. Dec. 24, 2015). 
 73. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 74. See In re Warrant for All Content & Other Info. Associated with the Email Account 
xxxxxxx@gmail.com Maintained at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 
397–98 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (arguing that an execution and retention deadline would hinder the 
government’s ability to review materials effectively, especially considering the possibility for 
relevant coded language being discovered later on in time). 
 75. See infra notes 78–86 and accompanying text. 
 76. See infra notes 87–92 and accompanying text. 
 77. See infra notes 93–96 and accompanying text. 
 78. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1168–69 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam) (describing the search restrictions that the magistrate judge 
imposed); Preventive Med. Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 992 N.E.2d 257, 263 (Mass. 
2013) (describing the motion judge’s order that the search utilize a “taint team” consisting of 
attorney general’s office employees who were not involved in the investigation or prosecution, 
in order to remove potentially privileged information); In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d 1158, 
1176 (Vt. 2012) (describing a judicial officer’s instructions that only the materials deemed 
relevant should be accessed by the case investigators). 
 79. This idea encompasses the use of independent third-party reviewers, where the 
individuals looking through the materials for responsive items are not members of the law 
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mechanism is generally aimed at preserving the confidentiality of materials 
for which the government does not have probable cause to seize or retain.80  
Courts that require this procedure do so on the basis that they promote either 
warrant particularity or overall reasonableness of the search.81  While the 
reasoning that underpins each decision to grant or deny a search warrant is at 
times imprecise, some courts have explicitly indicated that a particularity 
objective is served by limiting the case team to view only those materials that 
the warrant authorized.82  Courts do this to prevent the overbreadth that 
would otherwise occur during the two-step process.83  Concerned with the 
possibility that search warrants for electronic communications may become 
unconstitutional general warrants, appellate and trial court judges have urged 
their magistrate colleagues to restrict the review of electronic materials to 
those without affiliation with the case.84  As one circuit judge noted, 
[T]he warrant application should normally include, or the issuing judicial 
officer should insert, a protocol for preventing agents involved in the 
investigation from examining or retaining any data other than that for which 
probable cause is shown.  The procedure might involve, as in this case, a 
requirement that the segregation be done by specially trained computer 
personnel who are not involved in the investigation.  In that case, it should 
be made clear that only those personnel may examine and segregate the 
data.  The government should also agree that such computer personnel will 
not communicate any information they learn during the segregation process 
absent further approval of the court.85 
Although this measure could conceivably serve either justification, Judge 
Alex Kozinski articulated that these procedures enhance reasonableness by 
 
enforcement agency conducting the investigation. See In re Search of Premises Known as:  
Three Hotmail Accounts:  [redacted]@hotmail.com, [redacted]@hotmail.com, 
[redacted]@hotmail.com Belonging to & Seized from [redacted], No. 16-MJ-8036-DJW, 
2016 WL 1239916, at *22 (D. Kan. Mar. 28, 2016), aff’d in part sub nom. In re Search of Info. 
Associated with Email Addresses Stored at Premises Controlled by the Microsoft Corp., 212 
F. Supp. 3d 1023 (D. Kan. 2016).  Additionally, it includes the use of a “taint team,” which 
consists of individuals within the organization but not assigned to work on the case. See United 
States v. Sealed Search Warrant, No. 2:17-CR-103-VEH-TMP-1, 2017 WL 3396441, at *2 
(N.D. Ala. Aug. 8, 2017).  In both of these circumstances, the reviewing group would identify 
and provide only the materials falling under the scope of the warrant to the case team.  This 
technique is also commonly employed in the context of separating privileged information. See, 
e.g., United States v. Wey, 256 F. Supp. 3d 355, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (finding that the case 
agent and Assistant U.S. Attorney organized an FBI “wall team” to “segregate non-privileged 
from potentially privileged documents in advance of the case team’s substantive review of the 
material”). 
 80. See In re Three Hotmail Email Accounts, 2016 WL 1239916, at *21. 
 81. See, e.g., id. at *8, *21 (emphasizing the commitment to halt the issuance of general 
warrants for ESI and ultimately recommending the implementation of search protocol to offer 
protection from the threat of general warrants). 
 82. In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d at 1175 (stating that “[t]he separation and screening 
instructions are the judicial officer’s attempt to remedy this lack of particularity,” while also 
acknowledging that ex ante procedures are never required).  
 83. Id.  
 84. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1179 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en banc) (per curiam) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring). 
 85. Id. 
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ensuring that seizure does not exceed the bounds supported by probable 
cause.86 
The requirement to utilize specific keyword queries or filtering tools87 has 
been similarly implemented in order to ensure the particularity of the warrant, 
characterized as a way to describe the particular place to be searched.88  This 
procedure could either require a search by category, naming general areas or 
file paths that can be searched,89 or a free text search of items, including 
“names, usernames, email addresses, credit card numbers, dates, social 
security numbers” or general terms and phrases.90  While this may already 
occur for practical reasons during the review of voluminous warrant 
materials,91 imposing an ex ante requirement as an assurance of particularity 
could force law enforcement to generate a keyword list without knowledge 
of how large the initial seizure would be and could prevent further tailoring 
of the search to hone in on relevant results.92 
Another option involves mandating service providers to conduct an initial 
screening.93  This idea maintains the function of the keyword search—with 
 
 86. Id. at 1178 (stating that a magistrate’s mandate of an independent review team would 
“increase the likelihood that the searches and seizures of electronic storage that they authorize 
will be deemed reasonable and lawful”). 
 87. This entails the utilization of review platform tools to identify and focus on a subset 
of documents based on common characteristics.  For the purposes of this Note, this phrase 
includes (1) running searches for specific words or phrases that are present in a document, 
(2) filtering categories about the communication, such as by recipients or senders, dates or 
times, or associated IP addresses, or (3) utilizing advanced metrics to identify documents that 
fall under a common pattern. 
 88. See In re Search of Info. Associated with Fifteen Email Addresses Stored at Premises 
Owned, Maintained, Controlled or Operated by 1&1 Media, Inc., Google, Inc., Microsoft 
Corp. & Yahoo! Inc., No. 2:17-CM-3152-WC, 2017 WL 4322826, at *7 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 
2017) (“Often the way to specify particular objects or spaces will not be by describing their 
physical coordinates but by describing how to locate them.  This is especially true in the world 
of electronic information, where physical notions of particularity are metaphorical at best.” 
(quoting In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d 1158, 1170–71 (Vt. 2012))).  
 89. This is generally more applicable in the context of searches of computers or storage 
devices, although it may still be relevant in the review of cloud storage materials. 
 90. In re Search of Premises Known as:  Three Hotmail Accounts:  
[redacted]@hotmail.com, [redacted]@hotmail.com, [redacted]@hotmail.com Belonging to & 
Seized from [redacted], No. 16-MJ-8036-DJW, 2016 WL 1239916, at *20 (D. Kan. Mar. 28, 
2016), aff’d in part sub nom. In re Search of Info. Associated with Email Addresses Stored at 
Premises Controlled by the Microsoft Corp., 212 F. Supp. 3d 1023 (D. Kan. 2016) (finding 
that “ex ante instructions, as whole, are not per se unreasonable” but declining to decide 
whether the instructions suggested by Magistrate Judge David Waxse are reasonable). 
 91. Id. at *8; see, e.g., United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199, 202 (2d Cir. 2016) (en banc) 
(describing the procedure by which the records were reviewed and noting that new keywords 
were created and utilized when previous ones generated too many hits). 
 92. For example, if a review of materials using an individual’s name reveals a code word 
utilized in connection with the criminal conduct which was unknown at the time of warrant 
execution and not specified therein but would be more effective in identifying responsive 
items. See In re Warrant for All Content & Other Info. Associated with the Email Account 
xxxxxxx@gmail.com Maintained at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 
398–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).  
 93. See In re Three Hotmail Email Accounts, 2016 WL 1239916, at *19; In re Search of 
Info. Associated with [redacted]@mac.com That Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Apple, 
Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8–9 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[H]aving an electronic communication service 
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the exception that the records holder would perform the search instead of law 
enforcement—to limit the amount of data turned over to the government in 
the first place.94  Judge Facciola has suggested that the balance between law 
enforcement’s interests and an individual’s expectation of privacy can be 
achieved by requiring service providers to conduct an initial screening of the 
material for pertinent indicators.95  This argument is based on the premise 
that the “government surely knows how it intends to ultimately sort through 
the information [provided]” and that service providers are “technologically 
sophisticated actors” capable of executing that search themselves.96 
As some judges have imposed one of these mechanisms specifically, others 
have indicated that law enforcement could choose which of these ex ante 
measures to implement so long as some limitation is place.97  By providing 
the opportunity to choose which search limitation to exercise, the benefit 
from greater particularity or reasonableness arguably can be achieved while 
allowing law enforcement the traditional deference regarding the details of 
warrant execution.98 
Other courts have resisted requiring specific search protocol on the ground 
that the Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant to contain more than 
a particularized description of places to be searched and items to be seized, 
supported by probable cause.99  Courts have cited long-standing law 
enforcement discretion in determining execution details while rejecting an 
“attempt to constitutionalize document review procedures,” and they have 
even noted that the duty to review and identify responsive material did not 
 
provider perform a search, using a methodology based on search terms . . . suggested by the 
government and approved by the Court seems to be the only way to enforce the particularity 
requirement commanded by the Fourth Amendment.”).  While theoretically this idea could be 
separated from keyword searches, requiring that level of review would be overly burdensome 
for service providers. 
 94. In re Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@mac.com, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 7. 
 95. Id. at 8.  
 96. Id.  The court noted that, in fact, Google has already proven this capability as it 
“created an entire business model around searching the contents of e-mail in order to deliver 
targeted advertising, and it has done so for a decade.” Id. 
 97. In re Three Hotmail Email Accounts, 2016 WL 1239916, at *20 (stating that the 
government must only “educate the Court as to how it intends to minimize the discovery of 
ESI outside the scope of the warrant”).  
 98. See also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (commending the 
government’s suggestion in its brief that law enforcement should “‘develop protocols to 
address’ concerns raised by cloud computing” (quoting Reply Brief for the United States at 
14–15, Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (No. 13-212))). 
 99. See United States v. Kanodia, No. 15-10131-NMG, 2016 WL 3166370, at *7 (D. 
Mass. June 6, 2016) (“In overseeing the warrant process, the Court is ‘primarily concerned 
with identifying what may be searched or seized—not how,’ . . . and generally will not 
interfere with the discretion of law enforcement in determining ‘how best to proceed with the 
performance of a search authorized by warrant.’” (first quoting United States v. Upham, 168 
F.3d 532, 537 (1st Cir. 1999); then quoting United States v. Tsarnaev, 53 F. Supp. 3d 450, 464 
(D. Mass. 2014))); In re Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@mac.com That Is Stored 
at Premises Controlled by Apple, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 157, 165 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[B]ecause the 
government’s proposed procedures comply with the Fourth Amendment and are authorized 
by Rule 41, there is no need for Apple to search through e-mails and electronic records related 
to the target account and determine which e-mails are responsive to the search warrant.”). 
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require a particular process for memorialization.100  Rather than utilizing 
protocols as a method to gain particularity, courts can instead rely on a 
description of the nature and character of the content to be seized, apart from 
how it can be located.101 
Further, some argue the protocols described above are too restrictive and 
hinder the ability to identify responsive materials.102  As the volume of items 
that a service provider might have is frequently unknown when a judge grants 
a warrant, these ex ante requirements can prevent the government from 
implementing the most effective search procedure when they are in a better 
position to evaluate what that would be.103 
These protocols also face criticism on an individual level.  Mandating the 
use of keyword searches to limit the results can substantially restrict the 
effectiveness of the search, as communications clearly covered in the warrant 
might not utilize the exact language anticipated, and the process eliminates 
the use of context and other traditional methods of identifying relevant 
evidence.104  Judge Kozinski explains that limiting an electronic search by a 
suspect’s specific language would be “like saying police may not seize a 
plastic bag containing a powdery white substance if it is labeled ‘flour’ or 
‘talcum powder.’”105  Although keyword searches could be useful in 
identifying pertinent documents in certain circumstances, their utility can 
become more strained in the case of media or text-embedded images.106  
Along these lines, the use of keyword searching may hinder the ability to 
identify responsive material by eliminating the context of these 
 
 100. United States v. Lumiere, No. 16-CR-483, 2016 WL 7188149, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 
29, 2016). 
 101. United States v. Lee, No. 1:14-CR-227-TCB-2, 2015 WL 5667102, at *9 (N.D. Ga. 
Sept. 25, 2015).  In this case, the warrant enumerated specific crimes rather than allowing a 
search based on general criminal activity and “thus properly constrained the discretion of the 
executing agents.” Id.  To this point, there is a difference between legal seizure of a broad 
array of items and failure to meet the particularity requirement. See United States v. Sugar, 
606 F. Supp. 1134, 1151 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also United States v. Ninety-Two Thousand 
Four Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars & Fifty-Seven Cents, 307 F.3d 137, 149 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“Although the scope of the warrant was certainly extensive, the warrant was not general.”). 
 102. See also Kerr, supra note 47, at 1284–87 (discussing why ex ante measures are not 
required by the Fourth Amendment and how their implementation is unworkable and unwise 
given the high rate of constitutional error). 
 103. See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee’s notes to 2009 amendment 
(discussing the hesitancy to impose a “one size fits all” requirement). 
 104. See Brief for the United States at 51, United States v. Blake, 868 F.3d 960 (11th Cir. 
2017) (No. 15-13395-FF) (“[C]riminals may misspell words, intentionally or unintentionally 
use different terminology than the key words, or use coded or generally evasive language, such 
as ‘I did that thing you asked.’”). 
 105. United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Hill, 
322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090–91 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (Kozinski, J., sitting by designation)); accord 
United States v. Crespo-Rios, 645 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 2011).  
 106. United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1093 (10th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that 
search methods “must remain dynamic” due to the difficulty in outlining a satisfactory 
structure prospectively); see also United States v. Loera, 59 F. Supp. 3d 1089, 1137 (D.N.M. 
2014) (acknowledging that search warrants for ESI do not need to include specific search 
protocols since such searches are “inherent[ly] complex[] and unpredictab[le]”), appeal 
docketed, No. 17-2180 (10th Cir. Oct. 16, 2017). 
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communications along with the ability to make connections that may not be 
apparent in isolation. 
Requirements calling for service providers to perform an initial search are 
similarly criticized.  In addition to problems with the specific keywords 
utilized, such protocols are condemned for placing too much of a burden on 
service providers.107  Indeed, one court noted that it is “unrealistic to believe 
that Google or any other email host could be expected to produce the 
materials responsive to categories listed in a search warrant.”108  In addition 
to the burden of reviewing ESI content, and potentially duplicating the 
government’s efforts, service provider employees may not be capable of 
“interpret[ing] the significance of particular emails without having been 
trained in the substance of the investigation”109 and could miss “[s]eemingly 
innocuous or commonplace messages [that] could be the direct evidence of 
illegality the Government had hoped to uncover.”110 
Between requiring execution deadlines, retention limits, independent party 
review, keyword searches, service provider screening, or some combination 
of these approaches,111 magistrates seek to balance the governmental interest 
in obtaining the information with the privacy interests particularly with 
respect to the nonresponsive materials.  Such mechanisms seek to 
compensate for the two-step process by limiting the government’s access to 
nonresponsive material through search protocol and deadlines.  However, in 
addition to the concerns about each requirement individually, the range of 
measures as a whole leaves the application and execution of ESI search 
warrants inconsistent and unclear. 
B.  Ex Post Rulings Shaping the Boundaries of Reasonableness 
in the Digital Context 
While their magistrate counterparts try to anticipate reasonableness at the 
time the warrant is issued, trial courts have also sought to define the 
 
 107. See United States v. Deppish, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1220 (D. Kan. 2014) (finding that 
requiring the service provider to conduct a review of the material would be unreasonable and 
less effective than allowing “government agents to determine the relevance of particular 
emails”).  While service providers have expertise in navigating their own systems to identify 
and retrieve the specified types of data stored therein, they may not have the experience or 
resources to identify materials that constitute the evidence described in the warrant. See In re 
Search of Info. Associated with Fifteen Email Addresses Stored at Premises Owned, 
Maintained, Controlled or Operated by 1&1 Media, Inc., Google, Inc., Microsoft Corp. & 
Yahoo! Inc., No. 2:17-CM-3152-WC, 2017 WL 4322826, at *9 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2017) 
(stating that it would “generally be unrealistic to expect Google or another email provider to 
conduct the search for the Government”). 
 108. In re Warrant for All Content & Other Info. Associated with the Email Account 
xxxxxxx@gmail.com Maintained at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 
394 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 109. Id. at 395 (rejecting analogies between ESI warrants and subpoenas, as a service 
provider “typically searches only its own records, of which it is expected to have a full 
understanding of the source and content” and usually “is not called upon to search another 
party’s records”).  In this respect, knowledge of the organization and storage of customer data 
is distinct from familiarity with the actual data content. See id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Appendix C for a summary of the various mechanisms described in this Part. 
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boundaries of ESI searches in specific cases, driven by the specific set of 
facts at hand after the search is executed.112 
In evaluating the reasonableness of an ESI search, judges have considered 
the following areas:  (1) the duration of search execution, (2) implementation 
of search protocols, and (3) limitations in the warrant based on crime type, 
date range, or data type. 
1.  Establishing a Reasonable Time to Execute the Search 
The reasonableness of electronic search duration and retention of digital 
materials have been disputed in the courts even prior to the 2009 amendment 
to Rule 41.113  While the amendment resolved one issue (by stating that the 
required fourteen-day deadline for execution only applied to the first step), 
Rule 41 still leaves the timing of the second-step search to the discretion of 
the courts.114  The Advisory Committee delegated this determination to the 
courts due to the case-specific factors, including the technological effort 
involved, size of the return, and resources available, which can create varying 
standards for when completion of a search is possible.115  Yet the void has 
created significant variation in what courts have found to be a permissible 
amount of time to execute the second-step search, which makes it difficult to 
anticipate what will be considered reasonable in subsequent cases. 
Decisions on whether the duration of the review of ESI is reasonable have 
ranged from disapproval of a fifteen-month period116 to acceptance of 
subsequent searches after five years had elapsed.117  This variation can be 
partially attributed to fact-specific situations,118 but it also belies the lack of 
consistent guiding principles to evaluate the reasonableness of search 
 
 112. Reasonableness evaluations of search warrants are generally fact-specific exercises.  
This Part discusses decisions in this area, which do not provide much assistance for future 
determinations of reasonableness absent any benchmarks. 
 113. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 114. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee’s notes to 2009 amendment (indicating 
that the Committee considered but did not implement a presumptive or universal time period 
for subsequent off-site review because “the practical reality is that there is no basis for a ‘one 
size fits all’ presumptive period”). 
 115. Id. (“A substantial amount of time can be involved in the forensic imaging and review 
of information.  This is due to the sheer size of the storage capacity of media, difficulties 
created by encryption and booby traps, and the workload of the computer labs.”).  
 116. See United States v. Johnston, 789 F.3d 934, 941–43 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that an 
exhaustive search five years after the initial seizure was reasonable). 
 117. See United States v. Metter, 860 F. Supp. 2d 205, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that 
a fifteen-month delay in the government’s review of seized devices violated the Fourth 
Amendment); see also United States v. Jarman, 847 F.3d 259, 266–67 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding 
that a twenty-three month review of seized ESI was reasonable due to the complexity of the 
search and a time-consuming privilege review process); United States v. Gorrell, 360 F. Supp. 
2d 48, 55 n.5 (D.D.C. 2004) (holding that a ten-month delay in retrieving data from a seized 
computer did not warrant suppression, although it made note of the “lengthy” process).  
 118. Johnston, 789 F.3d at 942 (where an initial “bare minimum” search preceded a more 
thorough examination five years later when plea negotiations broke down); United States v. 
Christie, 717 F.3d 1156, 1163 (10th Cir. 2013) (finding that the delay in the search was 
reasonable where the agent was assigned to assist on other matters out of town in the 
intervening time). 
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duration going forward.119  Courts have independently contemplated factors 
while evaluating reasonableness in the timeliness of execution, but they have 
not established how these factors should be applied to future instances.  One 
of these factors involves the government’s delay in first initiating the review 
of the electronic materials, or, whether the government has evinced a “blatant 
disregard for its responsibility.”120  While the court recognized that there is 
no established deadline for the completion of a search, the government’s 
retention of “all imaged electronic documents, including personal emails, 
without any review whatsoever to determine not only their relevance to this 
case, but also to determine whether any recognized legal privileges attached 
to them, is unreasonable and disturbing.”121 
Another factor bearing on the reasonableness of the review period is 
whether the government subjected the materials to subsequent searches based 
on new information and theories developed about the case.122  In these 
instances, courts have expressed concern about continued searches for 
evidence under new theories of the case or more expansive areas not initially 
included in the warrant.123 
Beyond the question of what constitutes a reasonable time, courts and 
scholars disagree on whether a constitutional requirement that the review be 
conducted in a “reasonable time” exists.  The courts cited above, along with 
others, posit that the reasonableness standard permeates all aspects of the 
search, including the time frame to conduct the subsequent review.124 
 
 119. This challenge of the ability to predict “how long is too long” raises the question of 
whether the exclusionary rule would even apply if conduct is not “sufficiently deliberate that 
exclusion can meaningfully deter it.” United States v. Filippi, No. 5:15-CR-133 (BKS), 2015 
WL 5789846, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2015) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 
144 (2009)). 
 120. Metter, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 212, 215 (stressing that the delay in the start of the review 
was unreasonable and thus a violation of the Fourth Amendment, while acknowledging that 
“there is no established upper limit as to when the government must review seized electronic 
data”); see also State v. Zinck, Nos. 03-S-1000-1024, 04-S-2393-2444, 2005 WL 551447, at 
*2–3 (N.H. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2005) (holding the search of a computer’s contents to be 
unreasonable where the state “offered no justifiable reason for waiting approximately a year 
and one half to begin a search of the defendant’s computer”). 
 121. Metter, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 215. 
 122. See, e.g., United States v. Wey, 256 F. Supp. 3d 355, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
 123. See id. at 406 (stating that there is “no authority suggesting that simply because it has 
retained all originally searchable electronic materials, the Government is permitted to return 
to the proverbial well months or years after the relevant Warrant has expired to make another 
sweep for relevant evidence, armed with newly refined search criteria and novel case 
theories”); see also People v. Thompson, 28 N.Y.S.3d 237, 255 (Sup. Ct. 2016) (expressing 
concern with government officials searching “at their leisure” or when “some new issue in this 
case might arise”). 
 124. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983) (holding that the length of time 
for which property is seized is a factor that bears directly on the reasonableness of that seizure); 
United States v. Lustyik, 57 F. Supp. 3d 213, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that “[l]ike all 
activities governed by the Fourth Amendment, the execution of a search warrant must be 
reasonable” and “[l]aw enforcement officers therefore must execute a search warrant,” 
including, when applicable, review of recovered electronic communications “within a 
reasonable time”). 
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However, the nature of an off-site review of copied materials differs from 
the initial execution of a warrant in ways that cut against close review of 
search execution timeliness.  The purpose of the mandatory fourteen-day 
time frame, to “prevent the execution of a stale warrant,”125 is not relevant in 
the context of a review of ESI materials.  Since warrant staleness pertains to 
a temporal relationship between the acknowledged existence of probable 
cause and the likelihood that the evidence sought is still located in the place 
to be searched,126 it is less of a concern in the subsequent review of ESI, 
whose contents remain static once received from the service provider.127  
Additionally, the review duration does not impact or inconvenience any need 
the owner may have to use the materials, as would be the case for other types 
of warrants, and therefore lessens the need for a speedy return.128 
A close counterpart to search execution timeliness is regulation of the 
government’s retention of materials deemed to be nonresponsive.  In a given 
case, the two concepts can be intertwined as the retention of materials not 
covered under the warrant can be subject to subsequent or ongoing search 
during that time.129  There is a distinction, however, between the execution 
of a search during the span of the case and later retention of all materials, 
nonresponsive items along with evidence of crime, beyond the closing of an 
investigation or culmination of prosecution.  The concern over “indefinite” 
retention of such voluminous records relates to the possibility that they may 
be accessed in future investigations.  As contemplated in United States v. 
Ganias,130 this would transform a specific warrant into “the equivalent of a 
general warrant” after the fact.131 
In that case, Judge Denny Chin mused that, while there is practical need 
for the two-step process to search electronic materials, the accommodations 
afforded to electronic searches do not justify indefinite retention nor the 
 
 125. United States v. Brewer, 588 F.3d 1165, 1172 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States 
v. Syphers, 426 F.3d 461, 469 (1st Cir. 2005)). 
 126. Id. (“[A] warrant becomes stale if the information supporting the warrant is not 
‘sufficiently close in time to the issuance of the warrant and the subsequent search conducted 
so that probable cause can be said to exist as of the time of the search.’” (quoting United States 
v. Palega, 556 F.3d 709, 715 (8th Cir. 2009))); see also United States v. Mutschelknaus, 592 
F.3d 826, 830 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The computer media at issue here were electronically-stored 
files in the custody of law enforcement.  Because of the nature of this evidence, the . . . delay 
in searching the media did not alter the probable cause analysis.” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Brewer, 588 F.3d at 1173)). 
 127. This concern is ameliorated as the records will not be altered after the service provider 
produces them.  This situation is distinguishable from a physical location where someone may 
alter or move the items of interest during the time between the judge’s signature and the 
physical search. See Kerr, supra note 38, at 103 (“While it is desirable for electronic searches 
to occur quickly, staleness is not a concern after the container of evidence has been seized.”). 
 128. The materials companies provide under § 2703 are electronic copies of the data—the 
owner still retains the ability to access his or her account and the contents of the messages 
therein.  This is distinct from searches of entire computers, devices, or storage drives, which 
prevent the device’s owner from using the material contained therein for the duration of the 
search. 
 129. See, e.g., United States v. Wey, 256 F. Supp. 3d 355, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
 130. 755 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 131. Id. at 139. 
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ability to “search them whenever [the government] later developed probable 
cause” as it leads to a de facto evasion of the particularity requirement.132  
While search execution and retention of materials are two sides of the same 
coin, this distinction could reflect differing law enforcement justifications 
and therefore necessitate distinct treatment upon review. 
2.  Considerations in Limiting the Scope of the Review 
or Deploying of Search Protocols 
In the ex post evaluation of search reasonableness, courts have diverged 
on whether it is reasonable for law enforcement to manually review 
everything provided to them in an SCA warrant or whether officials must 
employ some limitation to minimize access to nonresponsive information.  
The government’s ability to search every electronic record is analogous to its 
ability to review physical materials:  If an agent would be allowed to review 
all of the records when they were printed and stored in a residence, why 
should she be precluded when they are stored digitally?133  In response to this 
rhetorical question, some answer that ESI materials are truly different—ESI 
requires greater restriction and procedural care.134  Unlike searching a desk 
or closet, SCA warrants have the potential to yield a size and scope of data 
incomparable to physical materials.  The data may comprise gigabytes or 
even terabytes of data that service providers retain in situations where the 
record ordinarily would not have been kept by the individual if it was 
generated and first used in a physical space.135  Underlying these concerns 
 
 132. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Lustyik, No. 2:12-CR-645-TC, 2014 WL 1494019, at 
*5 (D. Utah Apr. 16, 2014) (“The Government’s knowledge of the activity being investigated 
developed over time.  As the Government learned new details, the Government would go back 
and conduct targeted searches in the Relativity database using search terms for additional 
documents responsive to the warrants.  From time to time, and based on developing knowledge 
of the investigation, documents that were previously marked as irrelevant were re-reviewed 
and marked as relevant.”). 
 133. See United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 237–40 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that the 
search was reasonable since the detective “reasonably believed that [the folder] could contain 
evidence of financial crimes” and took measures to comply with the warrant’s provisions); 
United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 521 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he warrant impliedly 
authorized officers to open each file . . . and view its contents, at least cursorily, to determine 
whether the file fell within the scope of the warrant’s authorization.”); United States v. 
Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1094 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[T]here may be no practical substitute for 
actually looking in many (perhaps all) folders and sometimes at the documents contained 
within those folders.”); United States v. Sealed Search Warrant, No. 2:17-CR-103-VEH-TMP-
1, 2017 WL 3396441, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 8, 2017) (holding that “‘some perusal’ is generally 
necessary to determine the ‘relevance of documents to the crime’” and that “the investigative 
team itself is allowed to search despite the possibility that innocuous materials might be 
present” (quoting United States v. Slocum, 708 F.2d 587, 604 (11th Cir. 1983))).  
 134. See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999); Ohm, supra note 
50, at 6; Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 75, 103–05 (1994) (discussing the implications of large data volumes in the 
context of computer storage). 
 135. See Ohm, supra note 50, at 6 (“Hard drives store more information about more people 
of a more sensitive nature than filing cabinets ever have; the comparisons aren’t even close.”).  
Even focusing specifically on materials that communications companies provide through SCA 
authorization, searching these accounts is arguably very different from searching physical 
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about the volume and breadth of the types of materials that might be included 
is the apprehension that access may equate to a “general exploratory 
rummaging” and dramatically expand beyond the warrant’s authority.136 
Even given these concerns about the volume and sensitivity of ESI 
searches specifically, some courts that have recognized the need for some 
limiting principles have left the precise protocol to the discretion of law 
enforcement, subject to judicial review for reasonableness ex post.  For 
example, in the consideration of reasonableness, courts have rejected 
assertions that law enforcement should have employed a particular method 
of execution, such as utilizing an independent party to review emails,137 
recording the differentiation between “irrelevant” and “relevant” emails,138 
or requiring the use of keyword searches.139  These courts reject these 
motions in part because they do not believe their role includes dictating how 
a search is conducted.140 
3.  Use of Crime-Type Designations, Date Restrictions, or Data-Type 
Specifications to Evaluate Particularity 
Courts have also evaluated the constitutionality of a warrant ex post by 
examining whether the warrant was sufficiently particular with respect to the 
designation of a crime for which evidence can be seized, a temporal limitation 
on the date range of records, or the type of files sought as stated in the 
warrant.  By considering whether a warrant describes the items to be seized 
as evidence pertaining to a specified crime, courts have ruled that such cases 
 
materials due to gigabytes of storage available and the comingling of messages and data. See 
id.; see also Carey, 172 F.3d at 1275 (stating that analogizing ESI to physical record storage 
does not take into account the modern state of digital storage and leads to oversimplification 
of the law (citing Winick, supra note 134, at 108)). 
 136. See In re Search of Premises Known as Three Hotmail Accounts:  
[redacted]@hotmail.com, [redacted]@hotmail.com, [redacted]@hotmail.com Belonging to & 
Seized from [redacted], No. 16-MJ-8036-DJW, 2016 WL 1239916, at *4 n.10 (D. Kan. Mar. 
28, 2016), aff’d in part sub nom. In re Search of Info. Associated with Email Addresses Stored 
at Premises Controlled by the Microsoft Corp., 212 F. Supp. 3d 1023 (D. Kan. 2016); Ohm, 
supra note 50, at 11. 
 137. See United States v. Harder, Crim. No. 15-1, 2016 WL 7647635, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 
18, 2016); United States v. Shah, No. 5:13-CR-328-FL, 2015 WL 72118, at *18 (E.D.N.C. 
Jan. 6, 2015) (noting that “‘outsiders’ to an investigation may fail to recognize particular 
codes, concealment techniques, or other details that would not escape the notice of an officer 
more familiar with the circumstances of a case”); see also United States v. Lustyik, 57 F. Supp. 
3d 213, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding that the government did not act in bad faith when it 
reviewed, among other items, the contents of defendants’ email accounts without guidance of 
written search protocols). 
 138. See United States v. Lee, No. 1:14-cr-227-TCB-2, 2015 WL 5667102, at *1, *3–4 
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2015). 
 139. See United States v. Kanodia, No. 15-10131-NMG, 2016 WL 3166370, at *6–7 (D. 
Mass. June 6, 2016) (rejecting the defendant’s assertion that the government should have 
employed a keyword search or alternative procedures to limit the materials reviewed by the 
government). 
 140. Id. at *7 (noting that courts “generally will not interfere with the discretion of law 
enforcement in determining ‘how best to proceed with the performance of a search authorized 
by warrant’” (quoting United States v. Tsarnaev, 53 F. Supp. 3d 450, 464 (D. Mass. 2014))). 
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have met Fourth Amendment particularity requirements.141  The presence of 
a connection to specific alleged criminal activity sets these circumstances 
apart from searches for “general criminal activity,” the latter of which may 
fall outside constitutional boundaries.142 
Similarly, limiting the date range of the records sought is another 
recognized method to provide greater particularity.143  Given courts’ concern 
about the prospect of over seizing data in ESI cases, limiting the content that 
a service provider should deliver to materials within a specified date range 
limits exposure to potentially nonrelevant material at the first stage, 
especially if specific dates of criminal conduct are already known.144  This is 
not to say that the seizure of the full date range of the account’s existence is 
impermissible if probable cause supports the full time frame,145 but it can 
similarly be a tool to achieve constitutional warrant particularity. 
Further restrictions on data type, depending on the service provider and 
type of account sought, is another area of particularity that can be enforced 
at the first stage of the process.  As shown in Appendices A and B, warrants 
to service providers commonly state the relevant time periods and enumerate 
the types of data subject to the warrant, including messages, profile posts and 
comments, page likes, and IP address information.146  If certain types of data 
are not necessary or do not have a connection to the probable cause that 
supports the seizure of other items, there is an opportunity to add greater 
particularity to the warrant without affecting the mechanics of the 
government’s subsequent review.147  This ability to curtail the volume of 
results by date range and data type differentiates the particularity evaluation 
 
 141. See United States v. Deppish, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1221 (D. Kan. 2014) (finding that 
even without specified search protocol, limiting the seizure for items “with reference to a 
particular criminal statute” was a distinguishing factor). 
 142. See Shah, 2015 WL 72118, at *12–13 (citing United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 
667, 693 (4th Cir. 1999)). 
 143. See, e.g., United States v. Blake, 868 F.3d 960, 974 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that the 
warrants should have only requested records “from the period of time during which [the 
defendant] was suspected of taking part in [a] prostitution conspiracy”). 
 144. See United States v. Henshaw, No. 15-00339-01-CR-W-BP, 2017 WL 1148469, at *6 
(W.D. Mo. Feb. 24, 2017) (finding that a warrant that limited account information to a period 
of one year was sufficiently particular); Shah, 2015 WL 72118, at *14.  This analysis can be 
conducted at the time of the warrant application. See In re Search of Info. Associated with 
Fifteen Email Addresses Stored at Premises Owned, Maintained, Controlled or Operated by 
1&1 Media, Inc., Google, Inc., Microsoft Corp. & Yahoo! Inc., No. 2:17-CM-3152-WC, 2017 
WL 4322826, at *5–6 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2017) (indicating that such temporal restriction is 
not sufficient at the second step of the search, but must be incorporated when describing the 
materials service providers are ordered to provide); In re Search of Google Email Accounts 
Identified in Attachment A, 92 F. Supp. 3d 944, 952–53 (D. Alaska 2015) (denying a search 
warrant application seeking the entire content of email accounts without providing a reason 
for an unrestricted time frame). 
 145. See In re Warrant for All Content & Other Info. Associated with the Email Account 
xxxxxxx@gmail.com Maintained at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 
391–92 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that some latitude should be given to law enforcement to 
make a determination about the relevance of materials after brief examination). 
 146. See infra Appendices A–B (separately listing each type of account data to seize). 
 147. See Blake, 868 F.3d at 974.  
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for SCA warrants, as this option is unavailable in computer or device 
searches where ESI is not obtained from a neutral third party. 
C.  The Plain View Doctrine and Regulating Use of Materials Outside 
the Scope of the Warrant 
The implications of the plain view doctrine in the context of digital 
searches have similarly been weighed by courts and academia in light of the 
two-step review of electronic materials.148  Developed within the context of 
searches of physical locations, the plain view doctrine allows law 
enforcement officials to seize evidence they encounter inadvertently without 
meeting the ordinary warrant requirement.149  The typical situation where 
this arises in the physical world, which is also directly applicable to the ESI 
context, is when law enforcement identifies “some other article of 
incriminating character” during the course of a search warrant execution for 
other specified items.150 
Currently, circuit courts have a number of approaches to apply the plain 
view doctrine to electronic searches, necessitated by the two-step review 
process.  The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Williams,151 has treated the 
plain view doctrine the same as it would in searches of physical locations.152  
On the other end of the spectrum, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. 
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.,153 has suggested addressing the issue ex 
ante by encouraging magistrate judges to “insist that the government waive 
reliance upon the plain view doctrine.”154  In between these two positions, 
 
 148. See generally RayMing Chang, Why the Plain View Doctrine Should Not Apply to 
Digital Evidence, 12 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 31 (2007) (asserting that the plain view 
doctrine should not be applied to ESI); Kerr, supra note 53 (discussing the potential need to 
narrow the plain view in the context of computer hard drive searches); Corey J. Mantei, Note, 
Pornography and Privacy in Plain View:  Applying the Plain View Doctrine to Computer 
Searches, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 985 (2011) (suggesting the development of plain view doctrine 
application to ESI through case law); Andrew Vahid Moshirnia, Note, Separating Hard Fact 
from Hard Drive:  A Solution for Plain View Doctrine in the Digital Domain, 23 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 609 (2010) (proposing a balancing test to evaluate whether the plain view doctrine 
should permit evidence admission on a case-by-case basis); O’Leary, supra note 38 
(discussing the circuit split and four varying approaches regarding the applicability of the plain 
view doctrine to ESI warrants); James Saylor, Note, Computers as Castles:  Preventing the 
Plain View Doctrine from Becoming a Vehicle for Overbroad Digital Searches, 79 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2809 (2011) (asserting that the plain view doctrine turns digital searches into general 
warrants). 
 149. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (plurality opinion) (“[U]nder 
certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant.”). 
 150. Id.; see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326–28 (1987) (requiring the existence 
of probable cause to invoke the plain view doctrine and hazarding that the doctrine is not a 
tool to “extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something 
incriminating at last emerges” (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466)). 
 151. 592 F.3d 511 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 152. Id. at 523 (concluding that “the sheer amount of information contained on a computer 
does not distinguish the authorized search of the computer from an analogous search of a file 
cabinet containing a large number of documents” and that the established requirements for 
seizure under the plain view doctrine apply). 
 153. 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 154. Id. at 1180 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring). 
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the Tenth Circuit “limits the scope of a search by permitting investigators to 
search only those containers that could reasonably hold items described in a 
warrant”155 and the Seventh Circuit has followed a case-by-case approach to 
build policy incrementally.156 
While the applicability of the plain view doctrine to search warrants for 
ESI may impact how magistrates review warrant applications ex ante and 
how judges review warrant executions ex post, the doctrine as an issue by 
itself largely remains outside the scope of this Note.157  Still, it is important 
to recognize that ESI warrant applications are not insulated from preexisting 
search and seizure doctrine and concerns about the plain view doctrine can 
implicate a magistrate’s decision when granting a warrant.158 
D.  Policy Suggestions and Proposed Amendments to Rule 41 
In response to these issues pertaining to the second-step execution of ESI 
warrants under Rule 41, scholars have suggested approaches centered on 
(1) encouraging magistrate judges to implement ex ante orders governing the 
methodology of the search, (2) relying on pure ex post reasonableness 
review, or (3) changing Rule 41 to impose explicit requirements regarding 
the time frame allowed for execution or the search protocol employed. 
The first approach—encouraging magistrate judges to implement ex ante 
orders through the use of filter teams, keyword searches, service provider 
screening, and other mechanisms described in Part II.B—embraces the long-
standing role of the magistrate judge as the independent evaluator of whether 
the constitutional requirements have been met to first authorize a warrant.159  
 
 155. O’Leary, supra note 38, at 238 & n.171 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 
822–24 (1982)). 
 156. See United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 782 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 157. For additional information about the applicability of the plain view doctrine in 
searches of ESI, see supra note 148. 
 158. See In re Search of Premises Known as:  Three Hotmail Accounts:  
[redacted]@hotmail.com, [redacted]@hotmail.com, [redacted]@hotmail.com Belonging to & 
Seized from [redacted], No. 16-MJ-8036-DJW, 2016 WL 1239916, at *22 (D. Kan. Mar. 28, 
2016), aff’d in part sub nom. In re Search of Info. Associated with Email Addresses Stored at 
Premises Controlled by the Microsoft Corp., 212 F. Supp. 3d 1023 (D. Kan. 2016); In re 
Search of Google Email Accounts Identified in Attachment A, 92 F. Supp. 3d 944, 951 (D. 
Alaska 2015) (expressing concern that the plain view doctrine could “transform electronic data 
search warrants into general warrants”); In re [REDACTED]@gmail.com, 62 F. Supp. 3d 
1100, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2014); In re U.S.’s Application for a Search Warrant to Seize & Search 
Elec. Devices from Edward Cunnius, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1144–47 (W.D. Wash. 2011) 
(discussing the characteristics of electronic searches that require the government to forgo use 
of the plain view doctrine to maintain constitutional searches). 
 159. See, e.g., Nicole Friess, When Rummaging Goes Digital:  Fourth Amendment 
Particularity and Stored E-Mail Surveillance, 90 NEB. L. REV. 971, 1015 (2012); Athul K. 
Acharya, Note, Semantic Searches, 63 DUKE L.J. 393, 433 (2013); Day, supra note 57, at 497–
98; Saylor, supra note 148, at 2854–57.  Scholars have also suggested imposing elimination 
or use restrictions on the plain view doctrine. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Executing Warrants 
for Digital Evidence:  The Case for Use Restrictions on Nonresponsive Data, 48 TEX. TECH 
L. REV. 1 (2015) (proposing that use restrictions should apply to nonresponsive data and 
reserving judgment on the elimination of the plain view doctrine); Bryan K. Weir, Note, It’s 
(Not So) Plain to See:  The Circuit Split on the Plain View Doctrine in Digital Searches, 21 
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Similar to the reasoning of magistrate judges who have already issued 
secondary orders of this kind, this approach’s focus is the “intrusiveness of 
searching and seizing the contents of stored e-mails and files” and the 
potential for coming into contact with a greater volume and range of personal 
materials.160  In response to the potential differences in scope of electronic 
searches as well as the procedure that allows for review of these materials 
while in law enforcement’s possession, specific methodology is necessary to 
ensure particularity.161  As described in this Note, this approach is already 
being implemented to some extent, albeit without standardization. 
Those who advocate for the second approach—relying on pure ex post 
reasonableness review—call for patience in letting the law develop over time 
to be consistent with existing search and seizure doctrine.162  They assert that 
this approach will allow the justice system to reach a fair result naturally and 
without attempting to anticipate the methodologies that would weigh on 
reasonableness.163  Given the fact-specific nature of reasonable search 
determinations, ex post review may have the advantage of seeing how the 
conduct unfolded and the implications of varying protocols in fact rather than 
trying to anticipate the result.164  While suppression motions pertaining to 
electronic evidence are frequently reviewed, district courts and appellate 
judges vary considerably in their approaches to these issues.165  Further, even 
when courts have chosen not to enforce measures imposed ex ante,166 they 
have not precluded their continued use or alleviated the potential problems 
they can impose for subsequent reasonableness review.167 
Finally, another suggestion involves amending Rule 41168 to regulate the 
timing of the second-step search execution as well as to clarify the 
 
GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 83 (2010) (discussing the benefits of abolishing the plain view 
doctrine in digital searches). 
 160. Friess, supra note 159, at 1016. 
 161. Id.; see, e.g., In re Three Hotmail Email Accounts, 2016 WL 1239916, at *24. 
 162. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 47, at 1276. 
 163. See Moshirnia, supra note 148, at 634 (“By implementing an ex post judicial balancing 
test weighing society’s interest in protection against a defendant’s interest in the privacy of 
the material searched, courts may render suppression judgments more consistently and 
honestly.”); Samantha Trepel, Note, Digital Searches, General Warrants, and the Case for the 
Courts, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 120, 141 (2007).  
 164. Kerr, supra note 47, at 1293 (“The factual vacuum of ex ante and ex parte 
decisionmaking leads such restrictions to introduce constitutional errors that inadvertently 
prohibit reasonable search and seizure practices.”). 
 165. See supra Part II.B.  
 166. See, e.g., United States v. Filippi, No. 5:15-CR-133 (BKS), 2015 WL 5789846, at *4 
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2015) (choosing not to enforce the magistrate judge’s “Addendum to 
Search Warrant,” which stated that the electronic media search should be completed within 
sixty days of the warrant). 
 167. Kerr, supra note 47, at 1287 (arguing that “[e]x ante restrictions effectively deny 
courts an opportunity to announce the law in a de novo fashion”). 
 168. There are no current proposed amendments to Rule 41.  The most recent change, 
discussed at the last posted Committee meeting in April 2017, pertained to the 2016 
amendment granting authority to issue warrants for remote electronic searches. See Advisory 
Comm. on Criminal Rules, Minutes 2 (Apr. 17, 2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/ 
default/files/spring_2017_criminal_rules_committee_meeting_minutes_final_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZAP6-F2HM]. 
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particularity standards for the warrant.169  First, this proposed rule change 
calls for a characterization of the device seized170 and then applies a sliding 
scale for the allotted execution time.171  Second, it proposes that warrant 
applications include an accompanying affidavit from the examiner stating 
that the methodology implemented would limit the scope of the search, such 
as through keyword searches, searches of stored memory, review of 
metadata, or searches of only selected file types.172  These proposed 
amendments focus primarily on method and timeline of execution rather than 
directly targeting retention of nonresponsive material. 
III.  LIMITATIONS OF AD HOC ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS SEARCH 
WARRANT REGULATION AND PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF RULE 41 
Although courts have responded to the gaps in the law on an ad hoc basis, 
the root problem is not an isolated occurrence.  Due to the nature of warrants 
for ESI material, it is nearly guaranteed that law enforcement will obtain 
nonresponsive information from service providers.  The issue of what to do 
with these materials is therefore a universal concern.  Making readily 
workable amendments to Rule 41 would be the most appropriate and 
effective way of ensuring that baseline protections are met, which would 
provide greater guidance to law enforcement on what will be deemed a 
reasonable search in this context and would improve consistency in the 
execution of search warrants for electronic communications.173  The changes 
this Note proposes encompass three main ideas:  (1) separating review 
procedure for electronic communications under the SCA from materials 
seized directly from a subject (e.g., a computer, hard drive, or device from a 
search of a residence or other physical location), (2) establishing a cap on 
retention of materials deemed nonresponsive and limiting access to the case 
team after they have been designated as such, when technologically 
 
 169. O’Leary, supra note 38, at 233–34. 
 170. Id. (differentiating between a device that rises to an instrumentality of a crime and a 
device that is a mere storage vehicle). 
 171. Id. (proposing a range from thirty days to twelve months, with an option to apply for 
an extension). 
 172. Id. at 239–40.  O’Leary further elaborates that in the event that the examiner sees 
evidence of a crime beyond the scope of the warrant, she should immediately stop her review 
and seek a subsequent warrant to expand the search. Id. at 240. 
 173. Inconsistency across jurisdictions may preclude obtaining a warrant or significantly 
curtail the effectiveness of its execution depending on which magistrate hears the application.  
For example, the same application that a magistrate judge in the Southern District of New 
York would grant could very likely be denied or subject to greater restriction if brought before 
Judge Waxse in the District of Kansas. Compare In re Warrant for All Content & Other Info. 
Associated with the Email Account xxxxxxx@gmail.com Maintained at Premises Controlled 
by Google, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (refusing to impose ex ante 
restrictions on warrant execution), with In re Search of Premises Known as:  Three Hotmail 
Email Accounts:  [redacted]@hotmail.com, [redacted]@hotmail.com, 
[redacted]@hotmail.com Belonging to & Seized from [redacted], No. 16-MJ-8036-DJW, 
2016 WL 1239916, at *24 (D. Kan. Mar. 28, 2016) (requiring ex ante restrictions on search 
warrant execution).  While rational minds may disagree on the existence of probable cause or 
appropriate particularity in some cases, the variation in the context of ESI is arguably more 
pronounced. 
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feasible,174 and (3) applying a procedural step to regulate use of 
nonresponsive material rather than restrict search methodology.  Part III.A 
describes the insufficiency of the current inconsistent approaches to 
regulating and evaluating execution of electronic communications search 
warrants.  Then, Part III.B details the elements of the proposed amendment 
to Federal Criminal Procedure Rule 41. 
A.  Limitations of the Warrant Regulation and Evaluation Status Quo 
The myriad measures discussed in Part II all generally point to the same 
concerns:  how to mitigate the impact of nonresponsive material captured 
during the execution of these warrants and how to ensure that its inclusion 
does not turn the inquiry into an unconstitutional “general search.”175  Of the 
various restrictions imposed, some are not tailored to the root of the issue and 
collaterally affect the search for responsive data. 
Efforts to impose a deadline for the execution of the second-step searches 
of electronic communications, or attempts to identify what length of time is 
no longer reasonable after the fact, do not have the same utility in this context 
as they do for physical items, namely, addressing issues of staleness and 
inconvenience to the owner of the content.176  Absent this utility, determining 
that a search is unreasonable based solely on the duration of time to conduct 
it appears arbitrary.  Although there are certainly privacy concerns implicated 
by the retention of materials that do not fall within the scope of a warrant, 
this issue could be better addressed by focusing on what is done after an item 
is deemed nonresponsive.177 
Requiring specific search methodologies may also sweep too broadly and 
hinder the ability to conduct an effective search in the first place.  Practically 
speaking, the use of keywords, filters, and other indicators for advanced 
searching are likely already employed to triage large data sets.178  While they 
can have utility in terms of expediency, prohibiting a more thorough search 
when time and resources allow can raise concerns.  Preselection of keywords 
 
 174. Depending on the file types the service provider uses to deliver data, the review 
platform available may not always have the technological capability to restrict access rights 
for items marked nonresponsive.  Where it is technologically possible, such walling off should 
occur.  Where it is not possible, the case team should make an effort not to reexamine those 
materials affirmatively marked nonresponsive. 
 175. See supra Part II (describing ex ante requirements that judges have imposed to ensure 
greater particularity and ex post review frameworks to determine warrant execution 
reasonableness in searches of ESI).  
 176. See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text.  
 177. While delaying a search could be a mechanism to evade regulation of postsearch 
retention, it may prove more workable to identify cases where delay in conducting a search is 
a bad faith attempt to retain nonresponsive material rather than necessary to evaluate whether 
the search duration is reasonable.  The latter is particularly complicated given the number of 
variables that could affect search duration and the lack of an accepted time frame. See supra 
Part II.B.1 (discussing the breadth of time periods deemed reasonable to execute the search). 
 178. See United States v. Sealed Search Warrant, No. 2:17-CR-103-VEH-TMP-1, 2017 
WL 3396441, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 8, 2017) (positing that winnowing of the volume of 
documents may already be happening absent mandatory protocols as “Government agents 
generally do not manually search each and every document that is present”). 
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can be incomplete and ineffective if coded language is employed, especially 
as law enforcement may not be aware of the specific language before the 
search execution but could ascertain from the patterns and context of the 
communications.179  The suggestion that service providers conduct an initial 
search using such indicators and keywords is prone to the same pitfalls as 
initial searches run by law enforcement.  In addition, it places a greater 
burden on the provider and delegates investigative functions to private 
parties.180 
Approaches that call for the search to be conducted by an independent 
party, taint team, or special master could similarly prove too restrictive.  The 
search itself might be less effective without the expertise and knowledge base 
of trained law enforcement officials who know the case and may be better 
able to identify evidentiary material.181  In general, requiring the use of 
specific protocol in conducting a review of electronic communications could 
preclude use of constitutional search techniques and mechanisms that could 
identify responsive material with greater success.182 
B.  Modifying Rule 41 to Impose Retention Restrictions and Use-Based 
Procedures Instead of Execution Deadlines or Protocol Orders 
Instead of continuing with the current ad hoc approach or requiring law 
enforcement to select from a menu of possible restrictions ex ante, a future 
amendment to Rule 41 could offer rudimentary guidance without mandating 
specific measures that could curtail the ability to identify items within the 
scope of the warrant.  First, the rule covering materials obtained via SCA 
warrants should be distinct in some ways from hard drives, computers, and 
devices obtained directly from the subject.  While there are similarities in the 
volume and complexity of digital storage, there are also some important 
variations.  For instance, duration of the execution and retention of copies of 
information from online accounts may have less serious implications on the 
subject than the seizure of a device from the home or office.183  Additionally, 
the source of the materials can affect the forensic methodology necessary to 
access the relevant data.  Significantly, in the case of SCA warrants, an 
additional source of particularity may be available by specifying a pertinent 
 
 179. See supra Part II.A. 
 180. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.  
 181. See supra note 108 and accompanying text; see also In re Search of Info. Associated 
with [redacted]@mac.com That Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Apple, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 
3d 157, 165 (D.D.C. 2014) (discussing how service provider employees, “untrained in the 
details of the criminal investigation,” are unlikely to have sufficient experience and skill to 
make determinations of the document’s relevance to the criminal activity). 
 182. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.  
 183. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.  As these materials are copies of records 
that service providers retain and do not involve removing property from the owner’s 
possession, the subject is not deprived of his own records, documents, postings, or other 
communications. 
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date range or data type, which can limit what the service provider delivers to 
the government at the first step.184 
Second, the issue of limiting access to material outside the scope of a 
warrant can be addressed without imposing specific ex ante requirements that 
require a procedure that may not be appropriate given the size and form of 
the materials returned.  At the time of a search warrant application, it is 
frequently unknown how large the return will be and case-specific nuances 
can foreseeably lead to different redeterminations of reasonableness.185  By 
focusing on the issue of retention of materials after the search has been 
completed rather than placing a time limitation on execution, the rule could 
instead restrict retention of materials deemed nonresponsive to the end of the 
case186 and require the government to limit the case team’s access to 
nonresponsive items, within technological capability.  While, theoretically, 
mechanisms could be in place to petition the court to reaccess materials based 
on new information, the default procedure would limit the detrimental effect 
of the two-step process and mitigate the concerns expressed in cases such as 
Ganias.187 
Third, and closely related to retention, the various protocols and 
procedures discussed in Part II also seek to minimize exposure to 
nonresponsive materials in the first place to mitigate the effects of the two-
step process.  However, regulation of the subsequent use of nonresponsive 
material—for instance, items that are evidence of a different crime—would 
be a better tailored approach.  Regulating the use rather than the search 
addresses issues of nonresponsive material without undermining the 
practicality that the two-step process seeks to achieve.  Limiting the 
applicability of the plain view doctrine is one such use-based approach that 
has been considered by courts over the last ten to fifteen years.188  However, 
the purpose of the doctrine is the same irrespective of whether the search is 
 
 184. See supra notes 143–47 and accompanying text.  While the ability to parse different 
types of records necessary depends on the provider, some have publicly stated the ability and 
willingness to limit types of data made available. See Guidelines for Law Enforcement, supra 
note 32 (requesting that law enforcement list the specific information sought); Legal Process 
for User Data Requests FAQs, supra note 32 (“In some cases we receive a request for all 
information associated with a Google account, and we may ask the requesting agency to limit 
it to a specific product or service.”).  Since SCA warrants require a service provider to deliver 
a specified set of data in its possession, this ability to limit seizure at the first step is unavailable 
in the case of searches of computers or devices in the subject’s possession.  
 185. This was the advisory committee’s concern with imposing additional requirements in 
2009. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 186. It may be necessary to retain a complete copy of the original materials provided to the 
government for authentication purposes and for proving the integrity of the files. See United 
States v. Scully, 108 F. Supp. 3d 59, 100 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); In re Warrant for All Content & 
Other Info. Associated with the Email Account xxxxxxx@gmail.com Maintained at Premises 
Controlled by Google, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); see also United States 
v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 597 (9th Cir. 1982) (acknowledging the need, at times, to retain a 
complete copy of warrant materials for authentication purposes). 
 187. United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d 199 (2d 
Cir. 2016); see supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra Part II.C (describing the circuit split on the applicability of the plain view 
doctrine to ESI searches).  
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for physical or electronic items.189  Rather than be placed in an uncomfortable 
and counterintuitive position where the government or law enforcement 
agency would have to ignore evidence of another crime, requiring an 
additional procedural step to use items that were initially outside the scope 
of the warrant or to expand the search to cover those crimes prospectively 
could achieve a balance that is more consistent with existing search and 
seizure law.190 
While recognizing that not all issues relating to the reasonableness of ESI 
warrants can be addressed ex ante—primarily because the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness doctrine will still require case-specific 
determinations as to whether a given search is constitutional—the wide range 
of responses discussed in this Note illustrates how clarifying Rule 41’s 
procedure can, to some extent, standardize the execution of second-step 
searches.  Establishing baseline standards ex ante can provide more 
consistent privacy protection on the issue of record retention, while giving 
law enforcement officials greater confidence that their methodology will be 
effective and considered valid. 
CONCLUSION 
As we move further into the digital age, search and seizure procedure for 
electronic content continues to develop, although in varied and inconsistent 
ways.  The practical necessity of the two-step process—and with it the virtual 
guarantee that the government, at least initially, will have access to materials 
falling outside the scope of the warrant—will continue to raise questions of 
whether the nature of these searches requires additional procedural 
restrictions and what to do with the nonresponsive data.  While it is not 
feasible or even advisable to escape case-specific determinations of 
reasonable searches ex post, amending Federal Criminal Procedure Rule 41 
to address the retention and use of nonresponsive data could serve to curtail 
practices that undermine the efficacy of the search while also providing 
greater guidance on reasonableness in the ESI context and adding protection 
for account holders. 
  
 
 189. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 190. See supra notes 169–72 (describing a proposal that would impose additional 
procedural steps when law enforcement encounters evidence of a crime beyond the scope of a 
warrant’s authority).  
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APPENDIX A 
Proposed Search Warrant in 
the Case of the 2013 Navy Yard Shooter191 
 
Items for Facebook to provide to the government: 
(a) All contact and personal identifying information, including full name, 
user identification number, birth date, gender, contact e-mail addresses, 
Facebook passwords, Facebook security questions and answers, 
physical address (including city, state, and zip code), telephone 
numbers, screen names, websites, and other personal identifiers. 
(b) All activity logs for the account and all other documents showing the 
user’s posts and other Facebook activities; 
(c) All photos and videos uploaded by that user ID and all photos and videos 
uploaded by any user that have been tagged in them; 
(d) All profile information; News Feed information; status updates; links to 
videos, photographs, articles, and other items; Notes; wall postings; 
friend lists, including the friends’ Facebook user identification numbers; 
groups and networks of which the user is a member, including the 
groups’ Facebook group identification numbers; future and past event 
postings; rejected “Friend” requests; comments; gifts; pokes; tags; and 
other information about the user’s access and use of Facebook 
applications; 
(e) All other records of communications and messages made or received by 
the user, including all private messages, chat history, video calling 
history, and pending “Friend” requests; 
(f) All “check ins” and other location information; 
(g) All IP logs, including all records of the IP addresses that logged into the 
account; 
(h) All records of the account’s usage of the “Like” feature, including all 
Facebook posts and non-Facebook webpages and content that the user 
has “liked”; 
(i) All information about the Facebook pages that the account is or was a 
“fan” of; 
(j) All past and present lists of friends created by the account; 
(k) All records of Facebook searches performed by the account; 
(l) All information about the user’s access and use of Facebook 
Marketplace; 
(m) The types of service utilized by the user; 
 
 191. In re Search of Info. Associated with the Facebook Account Identified by the 
Username Aaron.Alexis That Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Facebook, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 
3d 1, 3–4 (D.D.C. 2013) (alterations in original). 
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(n) The length of service (including start date) and the means and source of 
any payments associated with the service (including any credit card or 
bank account number); 
(o) All privacy settings and other account settings, including privacy 
settings for individual Facebook posts and activities, and all records 
showing which Facebook users have been blocked by the account; 
(p) All records pertaining to communications between Facebook and any 
person regarding the user or the user’s Facebook account, including 
contacts with support services and records of actions taken. 
 
Information that the government would seize: 
(a) Records and information, and items related to violations of [18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1111, 1113, and 1114]; 
(b) Records, information, and items related to the identity of Aaron 
Alexis; 
(c) Records, information, and items related to the Washington Navy Yard 
or individuals working or present there; 
(d) Records, information, and items related to any targeting of, or planning 
to attack, the Washington Navy Yard or individuals working or present 
there, or any records or information related to any past attacks; 
(e) Records, information, and items related to the state of mind of Alexis, 
or any other individuals seeking to undertake any such attack and/or 
the motivations for the attack; 
(f) Records, information, and items related to any organization, entity, or 
individual in any way affiliated with Alexis; 
(g) Records, information, and items related to any associates of Alexis or 
other individuals he communicated with about his planned violent 
attacks, including the one perpetrated at the Washington Navy Yard 
on September 16, 2013; 
(h) Records, information, and items related to Alexis or his associates’ 
schedule of travel or travel documents; 
(i) Records, information, and items related to any firearms or 
ammunition; 
(j) Records, information, and items related to any bank records, checks, 
credit card bills, account information, and other financial records; and 
(k) Records relating to who created, used, or communicated with the user 
ID, including records about their identities and whereabouts. 
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APPENDIX B 
Court Order, Amending the Proposed Search Warrant, 
in the Case of the Navy Yard Shooter192 
 
(1) Facebook, Inc. is instructed to comply strictly with the terms of this 
Order and to provide only the following materials to the government: 
(a) All contact and personal identifying information related to the 
Account, including the Account holder’s full name, user 
identification number, birth date, gender, contact e-mail addresses, 
Facebook login details, physical addresses (including city, state, 
and zip code), telephone numbers, screen names, websites, billing 
information, and other personal identifiers associated with the 
Account; 
(b) All records relating to use of the Account, including session times, 
login/logout times, IP addresses from which it was accessed, and 
the types of services used; 
(c) All records related to the Account’s privacy settings; 
(d) All activity logs for the Account and all other records showing the 
Account’s posts, messages, and other activities on Facebook; 
(e) All photos and videos uploaded by the Account; 
(f) All records—but not content—relating to the Account’s list of 
friends, including any friend requests that were pending or rejected; 
(g) All records of communications—but not content—sent to the 
Account from another account or group, including the user ID of 
that account or group and the user name of the account or group, 
the date and time of the communication, whether attachments 
existed (subject to the limitations expressed infra); and 
(h) All records—including content—of communications generated by 
or sent from the Account to any other user or group (including 
postings). 
(2) Facebook, Inc. is instructed to comply strictly with the terms of this 
Order and is PROHIBITED from providing the following materials to 
the government without an additional Order from this Court: 
(a) The contents of any communications sent to the Account; 
(b) Photos and videos uploaded by other users, even if Aaron Alexis is 
“tagged” or otherwise mentioned or identified in the photos or 
videos; and 
(c) Any records or details about any groups of which the Account was 
a member, including those that were “liked” or of which the 
Account was a “fan” (or other similar term) other than the user ID 
and name of the user or group. 
 
 192. Id. at 5–6. 
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(3) Upon receipt of the above-described records and content, the 
government will then conduct a search to determine which relate to the 
following areas of investigation, as identified in the government’s 
application. These areas are: 
(a) Allegations that Aaron Alexis violated: 
(i) 18 U.S.C. § 1111; 
(ii) 18 U.S.C. § 1113; 
(iii) 18 U.S.C. § 1114; 
(b) Records and content related to the identity of Alexis; 
(c) Records and content related to any targeting of, or plans to attack, 
the Washington Navy Yard or individuals working or present there; 
(d) Records and content related to any other attacks planned or carried 
out by Alexis; 
(e) Records and content related to the motive of Alexis for the attack, 
including evidence of mental illness; 
(f) Records and content related to whether Alexis had any accomplices 
in planning or carrying out the attack on the Washington Navy Yard 
or individuals working or present there; 
(4) All records and content that the government determines are NOT within 
the scope of the investigation, as described above, must either be 
returned to Facebook, Inc., or, if copies (physical or electronic), 
destroyed. 
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APPENDIX C 
Ex Ante Protocols 
 
Process Brief Description Policy Objective 
Execution 
Deadline 
Creates a deadline by when the 
second-step review of material 
must be completed. 
Reasonableness of 
the search. 
Retention 
Limit 
Places a restriction on the 
amount of time law 
enforcement can retain 
nonresponsive material. 
(Usually at the end of the 
case.) 
Reasonableness of 
the search. 
Independent 
Review  
 
(including use 
of a special 
master or 
“taint team”) 
The search for materials that 
fall under the scope of the 
warrant is conducted by an 
independent (non-law 
enforcement) group of 
reviewers, or, alternatively, by 
a unit not associated with the 
case team. 
 
While there are differences 
between special masters and 
taint teams, they seek to 
achieve the same purpose of 
limiting case team access to 
nonresponsive material.  Those 
conducting the review pass 
along the responsive material 
and do not provide any 
information about the items 
deemed nonresponsive. 
Reasonableness of 
the search.  Serves 
to limit law 
enforcement access 
to material not 
within the scope of 
the warrant. 
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Process Brief Description Policy Objective 
Keyword 
Search and 
Filtering 
 
(applies 
similarly to use 
of other 
filtering 
parameters) 
Requires the execution of ESI 
warrants to utilize specified 
keyword searches based on the 
facts of the case and probable 
cause findings outlined in the 
warrant application.  Law 
enforcement is not permitted to 
review every file or document. 
Particularity of the 
warrant and 
reasonableness of 
the search.  Serves 
to limit law 
enforcement access 
to material not 
within the scope of 
the warrant. 
Service 
Provider 
Screening 
Similar to the keyword search, 
this process requires electronic 
communications service 
providers to use search terms 
or filtering parameters to limit 
the materials provided to law 
enforcement at the first step. 
Particularity of the 
warrant and 
reasonableness of 
the search.  Serves 
to limit law 
enforcement access 
to material beyond 
the scope of the 
warrant. 
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APPENDIX D 
Ex Post Review Bases 
 
Process Brief Description Policy Objective 
Execution Time 
Limit 
When deciding the 
admissibility of materials 
seized pursuant to ESI search 
warrants, the court determines 
whether the amount of time 
taken to conduct the search 
was reasonable.  Most 
warrants do not state a 
particular deadline ex post but 
evaluate whether the particular 
length of time taken was 
reasonable given the 
circumstances. 
Reasonableness of 
the search.  
(Finding that 
reasonableness 
applies to all 
aspects of the 
search.) 
Failure to 
Follow Review 
Protocol  
 
(not specified in 
warrant) 
Arguments have been made by 
defense attorneys that the 
failure to employ various 
limitations on search 
methodology (even without 
specification in the warrant) is 
unreasonable.  Generally, these 
arguments are not successful. 
Reasonableness of 
the search.  Serves 
to limit law 
enforcement access 
to material not 
within the scope of 
the warrant. 
Noncompliance 
with Review 
Protocol  
 
(specified in 
warrant ex 
ante) 
Noncompliance with the 
search requirements in the 
warrant is per se unreasonable 
and evidence obtained 
pursuant to such search should 
not be admitted.  These 
decisions are often framed in 
language of compliance with 
an order rather than 
reasonableness. 
Reasonableness of 
the search.   
3032 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
Process Brief Description Policy Objective 
Non-
Enforcement of 
Specified Ex 
Ante Protocol 
The refusal to exclude 
evidence obtained despite 
failure to follow a search 
methodology required in the 
warrant under the rationale 
that reasonableness of the 
search depends on case-
specific circumstances that 
could change from what was 
anticipated ex ante.  Focus is 
on reasonableness rather than 
compliance. 
Reasonableness of 
the search. 
Evaluation of 
Data 
Limitations 
Consideration of whether the 
warrant was sufficiently 
particular with respect to the 
stated crimes to which the 
seized evidence should pertain 
as well as the date range of 
records and type of data 
sought. 
Warrant 
particularity and 
whether supported 
by probable cause. 
 
